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Abstract
We show how to value both variable generation and energy storage in such a
way as to enable them to be integrated fairly (from the point of view of capac-
ity providers) and optimally (from the point of view of society) into electricity
capacity markets, for example that which operates in Great Britain. We de-
velop a theory based on balancing expected energy unserved against costs of
capacity procurement, and in which the optimal procurement may be expressed
as that necessary to meet an appropriate reliability standard. In the absence
of variable generation and storage the entire theory reduces to that already in
common use—both in the definition of a standard and in its economic justi-
fication. Further the valuation of both variable generation and storage in the
proposed approach coincides with the traditional risk-based approach leading
to the concept of an equivalent firm capacity. The determination of the equiv-
alent firm capacity of storage requires particular care; this is due both to the
flexibility with which storage added to an existing system may be scheduled,
and also to the fact that, when any resource is added to an existing system,
storage already within that system may be flexibly rescheduled.
1 Introduction
In order to ensure the adequacy of electricity supplies it is now necessary to provide
a capacity market, or mechanism, in many countries of the world, including Great
Britain (see, for example, the discussions in [9, 16, 12]). The purpose of such a
market is typically to guarantee the availability of an appropriate level of capacity
during particular years in the future, and to obtain this capacity at minimum cost.
So as to operate such a market both fairly and optimally it is necessary to value
correctly the contributions of the individual capacity providers, whether they provide
conventional generation, variable generation, or storage. The present approaches to
capacity market design have primarily been designed with conventional generation
in mind, e.g. in GB [13] and in the various North American systems which operate
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such a market [3, 12]. Conventional generation is typically, and often naturally,
treated analogously to firm capacity, i.e. as capacity which is able to supply energy
as needed up to a given constant rate. (In order to do so the nominal capacity of
any individual generator is usually multiplied by an appropriate “de-rating” factor
to acknowledge the fact that it is occasionally unavailable—see [13, 3].)
When all capacity is firm, an economic theory of capacity markets is relatively
straightforward, and is based on balancing investment or procurement cost against
the cost of unserved energy—see, for example, the textbook treatment of [19] and, for
more detail, [22]. The paper [2] considers the impact, within a linear programming
formulation and in terms of reduction in societal welfare, of incorrectly de-rating
variable generation in order to treat it as if it were firm capacity, but does not con-
sider storage, and does not consider the mechanism of running a capacity market.
Both variable generation—e.g. wind power and solar power—and storage now have
important contributions to make to capacity adequacy. The present paper shows
how, under appropriate circumstances which we identify, current approaches to ca-
pacity market design (as in GB and the US as referenced above) may be extended
to give an integrated theory for the inclusion within a capacity market of all types
of capacity provision. Again as at present, the theory is necessarily based on a
probabilistic description of the electricity supply-demand balance process. However,
storage in particular has a natural energy constraint and thus can supply energy
only for a limited period of time before its energy requires to be replenished; subject
to this constraint it may be scheduled flexibly. Hence, in order to understand both
how to schedule storage and to determine its contribution to capacity adequacy, it is
necessary to pay more attention than would otherwise be required to the sequential
statistical structure (i.e. the time evolution) of the supply-demand balance process
to which that storage is contributing—see, for example, [15] and also the more de-
tailed discussion of Sections 2 and 3. The present paper extends and generalises
theory which was developed by the authors in conjunction with National Grid ESO
for the integration of storage in the GB capacity market—again see [15]. However,
the theory is applicable wherever the capacity contributions of variable generation
and storage need to be correctly assessed.
The determination of a volume of capacity-to-be-procured in a capacity market may
be achieved either via the satisfaction of an appropriate security-of-supply standard
defined in terms of some given system risk metric or via the minimisation of an
appropriate economic cost. (In the latter case the capacity-to-procure may be vari-
able and specified as a function of the clearing price in the capacity auction, as
is currently the case in GB—see Section 5.) These two approaches are closely re-
lated; indeed the latter approach yields the former as a sub-problem—see Section 5.
In either case, a key step in the development of an integrated theory of capacity
markets is that of the provision of an appropriate definition of the equivalent firm
capacity (EFC) of any capacity-providing resource. In essence, the EFC of any such
resource is that firm capacity which makes an (appropriately defined) equivalent
contribution to the overall supply-demand balance. Hence such an EFC is necessar-
ily defined with respect to the pre-existing supply-demand balance process to which
this resource is being added—see [21, 5]. When the set of capacity-providing re-
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sources contains significant storage, particular care is required in the determination
of EFCs. One reason for this is the need to account for the flexibility of scheduling
of additional storage added to an existing supply-demand balance process. How-
ever, a more subtle reason is the following: when any further resource is added to
an existing set of capacity-providing resources which already contains storage, that
pre-existing storage may also be rescheduled so as to enhance the usefulness of the
additional contribution. This is particularly so when the additional contribution is
firm capacity. A consequence of this, as we show formally at the end of Section 3
and demonstrate in the example of Section 6, is that the EFC of further storage
added to an existing system is less (than it would otherwise be) in the case where
that additional system already contains significant storage. An intuitive explana-
tion is that the flexibility provided by further storage is less useful in the presence
of existing, already flexible, storage.
In any theory of capacity adequacy, the two most commonly used risk metrics are
loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) and expected energy unserved (EEU)—see [1, 11,
21]. LOLE is defined as the probabilistic expectation of the total length of time
during a given year or peak season in which the system under study is undergoing
loss-of-load or shortfall, i.e. the supply of energy is insufficient to meet demand,
while EEU is the expectation of the total volume of demand which is unmet over
all such periods of shortfall, i.e. the expectation of the total unserved energy. More
formal definitions are given in Section 2. In the case where all capacity may be
treated similarly to firm capacity—as is usually the case for appropriately de-rated
conventional generation—an economic criterion based on the uniform valuation of
unserved energy is equivalent to one based on either an LOLE or an EEU standard
provided the various parameters are correctly aligned—see Section 5.
However, security-of-supply standards are presently more commonly defined via the
use of the LOLE risk metric. We shall argue below that, in the presence of either
variable generation or storage, LOLE is not be the best measure of system reliability.
This is especially so in the case of storage. We discuss this in detail in Section 5,
giving also the relevant mathematics, but for the moment a simple example suffices
to indicate why the use of LOLE as a metric may be problematic. Suppose that a
certain volume of stored energy is available to mitigate, but not wholly eliminate,
a given period of shortfall (say of a few hours duration) in the supply-demand
balance. The loss-of-load duration, and hence LOLE, will be minimised by using
this additional stored energy to eliminate entirely the shortfall at those times within
the above period at which this is most efficiently achieved, i.e. at those times at which
the depth of the original shortfall is least—since this maximises the total length of
time for which there is no longer any loss-of-load—see the left panel of Figure 1.
However, it might reasonably be argued that in practice the available stored energy
would be at least as well employed in instead minimising the maximum depth of
shortfall in supply during the period concerned, a policy which would achieve the
same reduction in unserved energy but quite possibly result in no reduction in loss-
of-load whatsoever, as illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 1. Indeed, from an
economic perspective, the latter policy would be clearly better (and indeed optimal
within a deterministic environment) if the unit cost of unserved energy were an
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increasing function of shortfall depth. Further, regardless of how unserved energy is
valued, the former policy of using stored energy to minimise loss-of-load during what
would otherwise be the shortfall period does not make as effective a contribution to
system reliability as would the use of firm capacity to achieve the same reduction
in loss-of-load: unlike storage such firm capacity would continue to contribute even
at those times when shortfall was not completely eliminated—see the right panel of
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Use of a given volume of storage to mitigate a given period of shortfall.
The left panel shows the reduction (shaded) in shortfall when the stored energy is
used to minimise the loss-of-load duration; the middle panel shows the reduction
when the same stored energy is used to minimise the maximum depth of shortfall;
the right panel shows the reduction in shortfall (again shaded) which occurs when
firm capacity is used to achieve the same loss-of-load duration as in the left panel.
The above difficulties in measuring the contribution of storage in particular arise on
account of its time-limited duration combined with its flexibility of use. Notably, in
the presence of storage, LOLE may be varied in a manner which (as illustrated in the
above example) does not obviously relate to system adequacy as usually understood.
To a lesser extent there may be analogous difficulties with variable generation—
again see [2]; however, the times at which variable generation is available are not
controllable in the same way as for storage. When electricity capacity is provided
solely via conventional generation, and when the latter is capable of being modelled
as if it were (appropriately de-rated) firm capacity, then within a given system the
relation of LOLE to, for example, an economic measure of system adequacy such
as uniformly-valued EEU is essentially predetermined, and the above difficulties do
not then arise. We give a more precise mathematical treatment of these ideas in
Sections 4 and 5.
Throughout the present paper we treat the process of electricity demand as given.
However, demand management, or demand response, may also be used to assist
in balancing electricity supply and demand. Demand management has many of
the characteristics of storage—in particular any instance of such management can
typically make a flexible contribution to the supply-demand balance process but
only for a period of time of limited duration. Thus demand management may be
viewed as a form of “virtual storage”. Its contribution to electricity capacity, and
its integration into capacity markets, may be analysed analogously to the treatment
of storage given here.
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Sections 2 and 3 of the paper study respectively some properties of risk metrics
and of equivalent firm capacity. The latter is necessarily defined in terms of some
given risk metric and is essential to the understanding of both capacity adequacy
and the operation of a capacity market. The studied properties are implicit in the
theory of present markets which are concerned primarily with conventional gener-
ation. However, so as to understand how to incorporate into such markets both
variable generation and time-limited but flexible resources such as those provided
by storage, it is necessary to make these properties and some associated assump-
tions more explicit. Risk metrics are treated in general; however, we pay particular
attention to LOLE and EEU. Such metrics may be regarded as functions of the set
of capacity-providing resources and, in order to obtain a tractable theory of capacity
markets, we require continuity and smoothness assumptions about the behaviour of
such risk metrics as the available capacity-providing resource is varied. Such as-
sumptions are often implicit in other work, e.g. [2]. We formulate these assumptions
explicitly, and argue that they are usually sufficiently satisfied in practice, includ-
ing in present-day markets. The smoothness assumption yields an important local
additivity property for equivalent firm capacities, which is essential for the correct
operation of markets—even in the case where all resource is provided by firm capac-
ity. In Section 3 we also show how to determine the EFC of marginal contributions
of both variable generation and storage when the objective is the minimisation of
EEU. In the case of storage this requires consideration of how it may be optimally
scheduled.
Section 4 studies the operation of capacity markets when the objective is that of
obtaining at minimum cost sufficient capacity to meet a given security-of-supply
standard defined in terms of a risk metric. Section 5 studies the operation of such
markets when, as discussed earlier, the objective is that of the minimisation of an
overall economic cost. In particular we study the relation between economic and
risk-based approaches to capacity market operation. It is known that, when all
capacity-providing resource may be treated as firm capacity, an approach based on
the minimisation of an overall economic cost in which the cost of unserved energy is
proportional to EEU is equivalent to an risk-based approach using LOLE. We study
the conditions required for this result to continue to hold in the presence of variable
generation. Further, the theory requires substantial modification in the presence of
storage, as discussed in Section 5.
The flexibility of storage scheduling has important consequences for the way in
which a capacity market operates, and these are illustrated in the detailed example
of Section 6. This example show the application of nearly all the above theory,
and is chosen to be realistic in the context of a country such as GB. In particular it
demonstrates the practical reasonableness of the assumptions required for a tractable
theory.
2 Risk metrics
In the analysis of the adequacy of energy systems, the length of time over which
system risk is to be assessed—typically either a year or a peak season—is usually
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divided into n time periods, each typically of an hour or a half-hour in length—see [1,
15]. Let the random variablesDt andXt denote respectively the total energy demand
and total energy supply in time period t. Then the supply-demand balance in the
time period t is given by the random variable Zt = Xt−Dt. In particular values of Zt
less than zero correspond to an energy shortfall or loss-of-load at time t, and then the
level or depth of shortfall at that time is given by the random variable max(−Zt, 0).
Any risk metric ρ is a function of the entire supply-demand balance process (Zt, t =
1, . . . , n). Risk metrics may either be used directly in the setting of appropriate relia-
bility standards—as in the case of the present GB LOLE-based standard (see [15])—
or may arise naturally in the context of economic approaches to determining security-
of-supply (see Section 5). Commonly used risk metrics are LOLE and EEU given
respectively by
LOLE =
n∑
t=1
P(Zt < 0), (1)
EEU =
n∑
t=1
E(max(−Zt, 0)) =
n∑
t=1
∫ 0
−∞
P(Zt < z) dz, (2)
where P denotes probability and where E denotes expectation—again see [1, 21].
Thus, in the present discrete-time setting, LOLE is the expected number of periods
of shortfall during the season under study, while EEU is the expectation of the sum
of the depths of shortfall during successive periods, i.e. the expectation of the total
unserved energy.
In an economic context the use of EEU as a measure of economic cost corresponds
to a uniform valuation of each unit of unserved energy, regardless of the overall
depth of energy shortfall at any given time. The present paper mainly considers
such a uniform valuation of unserved energy; however, in many systems modest
levels (depths) of shortfall may be managed without significant ill effects by the use
of emergency actions such as voltage reduction, while the avoidance of economic or
other damage becomes increasingly difficult as the depth of shortfall increases. Thus
it may be natural in such cases to value unserved energy more highly at higher levels
of shortfall.
We take as given the demand process (Dt, t = 1, . . . , n) over the successive time
periods in which the system is to be studied. The energy supply process (Xt, t =
1, . . . , n), and hence the value of any risk metric, is then determined by the set
of capacity-providing resources (conventional generation, variable generation, and
storage). We denote by R the set of such capacity-providing resources, and regard
any risk metric ρ as a function ρ(R) of the set R. We assume that the resources
within the set R are optimally used for the minimisation of overall system risk—this
is important in the context of flexible resources such as storage which may be used
in different ways to support the system. We assume, as is the case with standard
metrics such as LOLE and EEU, that any risk metric ρ is such that ρ(R) is decreasing
as the set of resources R is increased.
Typically, for a large system, the effect on the overall state of the system—as mea-
sured by the risk metric of interest—of the addition or subtraction of a single unit
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of resource is small. The optimality of the state of the system (by some criterion) is
characterised by some appropriate form of equilibrium with respect to marginal, i.e.
relatively small, variations in that overall state caused by the addition or subtrac-
tion of individual resources. So as to obtain a reasonable and tractable economic
theory, we require continuity and smoothness assumptions with respect to such
marginal variations. The continuity assumption is that of the reasonably contin-
uous availability of capacity, i.e. that the state of the macroscopic system, as for
example measured by the risk metric ρ, may be varied continuously—at least to a
good approximation—by the addition or subtraction of individual units of capacity-
providing resource. In large systems this is a reasonable approximation and one
which is usually made in practice in the design of current capacity markets. An
exception occurs where we are considering some very large individual resource, such
as perhaps a large nuclear plant; however, as we discuss in Section 4, it is straight-
forward to deal with a small number of such large contributions. The smoothness
assumption is that, for any set of resources R, the reduction in risk ρ(R)−ρ(R∪{i})
resulting from the addition of some further marginal (i.e. small) resource i to the
set R is, to a good approximation, unchanged by small variations in the set R. More
formally this may be expressed by the requirement that, for any small resource j
(representing the above variation in the set R) and for further small resource i, we
have to a good approximation that
ρ(R ∪ {i, j})− ρ(R ∪ {j}) = ρ(R ∪ {i})− ρ(R), (3)
where by R ∪ {i, j} is meant the set of resources R supplemented by the further
resources i and j, and where, as the contribution of the resources i and j tends to
zero, the percentage error in the relation (3) becomes negligible. This smoothness
assumption is a essentially a form of differentiability assumption—see the discussion
on firm capacity below—and is generally well satisfied in most applications and for
most risk metrics, including those discussed above.1 In the extended example of
Section 6, which is chosen to be reasonably representative of a system such as that
in GB, we check the applicability of both the above assumptions.
The concept of firm capacity, defined as energy supply which is guaranteed to be
available up to a given constant rate throughout the overall period under consid-
eration, plays a particular role as a reference measure in assessing the usefulness
of other forms of capacity providing resource—see Section 3. In the special case
where we consider variations about the set of resources R given by variations in firm
capacity, it is therefore helpful to write (in a mild abuse of notation) R + y for the
set of resources R supplemented by firm capacity able to supply energy at a fur-
ther constant rate y, and to allow that y may be continuously varied. In particular
this will be important when we consider equivalent firm capacity below. Then it is
straightforward to show that, for such variation, the above smoothness assumption
implies that there exists the derivative ρ′(R) of ρ(R) with respect to firm capacity;
1The smoothness assumption is not guaranteed: it is possible to imagine (in a very artificial
situation) that two capacity-providing resources i and j might each make identical reductions in
risk, as measured by the metric ρ, but be such that the use of both together achieved no further
reduction in risk than the use of either singly, in which case (3) would fail.
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the latter is such that, for small variations of the total resource R by firm capacity y,
ρ(R+ y) = ρ(R) + ρ′(R)y, (4)
(the relative error in this approximation tending to zero as y tends to zero). This
derivative plays an important role in subsequent analysis.
3 Equivalent Firm Capacity
Throughout this section we take as given a suitable risk metric ρ. Then, given also
any set of capacity-providing resources R, the contribution of any further resource i
(conventional generation, variable generation, or storage) to be added to the set R
may be measured by its equivalent firm capacity (EFC) efcR(i). This is the firm
capacity which, if added to the set R in place of the additional resource i, would
make the same contribution to security-of-supply, as measured by the risk metric ρ.
Formally, the constant efcR(i) is the solution of
ρ(R ∪ {i}) = ρ(R+ efcR(i)), (5)
where, as defined in Section 2, the notation R+efcR(i) on the right side of (5) corre-
sponds to the set of resources R supplemented by firm capacity equal to efcR(i)—see,
e.g., [11, 21, 15]. (Of course, when the resource i is itself firm capacity yi for some
yi > 0, as may be the case with conventional generation, then we have efcR(i) = yi
regardless of the set R to which i is being added.) When the set R contains resources
such as storage which may flexibly used, the addition of further resource to this set
may result in a different pattern of usage of the resource within R itself: on both
the left and the right side of (5) it is assumed that the total available resource is
being optimally used. Note also that the EFC of a resource which is not itself firm
capacity, for example, variable generation or storage, depends also on the existing
set of resources R to which it is being added—see, e.g., [21, 5]. This will be partic-
ularly important in Sections 4 and 5 for developing satisfactory theories of capacity
adequacy and capacity markets.2
It follows from (4) and from the definition (5) of EFC that, for the addition of any
marginal (i.e. small) resource i to the set R,
ρ(R ∪ {i}) = ρ(R) + ρ′(R)efcR(i), (6)
(where the derivative ρ′(R) in (6) remains, as in (4), that defined with respect to
variation in firm capacity). Thus, for any existing set of resources R, and with
respect to the risk metric ρ, the contribution to risk reduction given by any further
marginal resource i is proportional to its EFC efcR(i). It hence makes sense to
2It is also possible to define the equivalent load carrying capacity (ELCC) of any further resource i
with respect to an existing set of resources R. This is the constant elccR(i) given by the solution
of ρ(R ∪ {i} − elccR(i)) = ρ(R). By writing ρ(R) as ρ(R − elccR(i) + elccR(i)) we have that
elccR(i) = efcR−elccR(i)(i), so that we shall find it sufficient in the present paper to work with
EFCs. It is further an easy consequence of our earlier smoothness assumption that for any small
additional resource i to be added to the set R, efcR(i) and elccR(i) are approximately equal (again
in terms of relative error).
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value such additional resources proportionally to their EFCs—see Section 4. We
further have local additivity of the EFCs of such marginal variations about the set
of resources R, that is, for marginal additions i and j to the given set R,
efcR({i, j}) = efcR(i) + efcR(j), (7)
where by the left side of (7) is meant the EFC of the combined resources i and j,
and where the relative error in (7) again tends to zero as the additional resources i
and j reduce in size. The property (7) is a straightforward consequence of the
relation (6) and the further application of the smoothness assumption (3): for each
term in the latter, the substitution of that term by the expression given by (6)
yields (7) immediately. The local additivity result (7) does not hold in the case of
larger variations about the set R, something which we discuss further in Section 4,
and illustrate in Section 6.
Determination of EFCs. As discussed above, the EFC efcR(i) of any capacity-
providing resource i added to an existing set of resources R is defined by the solution
of equation (5). The solution of this latter equation may involve trial values of efcR(i)
and may not always be straightforward. Provided that the additional resource i is
marginal (i.e. small) in relation to the existing set of resources R, then it is generally
more straightforward to obtain the EFC efcR(i) of the further resource i via the
solution of the equation (6) above, i.e. as
efcR(i) =
ρ(R ∪ {i})− ρ(R)
ρ′(R)
; (8)
typically all the quantities on the right side of (8) may be readily estimated, e.g. via
simulation. (Recall that the equation (8) is ultimately a consequence of the earlier
smoothness assumption, the validity of which we check in our extended example of
Section 6.)
In particular, as we argue in the Introduction and further in Section 5, it is often
natural to take the underlying risk metric ρ to be given by EEU. Then, in order to
use (8), we require an expression for the derivative EEU′(R) of EEU(R) with respect
to firm capacity. For any set of capacity-providing resourcesR which consists entirely
of generation, either conventional or variable, this is given by
EEU′(R) = −LOLE(R). (9)
The result (9) is known in the case where all the resource within the set R is pro-
vided by firm capacity, for example conventional generation—see [6]; its proof in the
present case—where R may also contain variable generation (but not storage)—is
essentially the same and is given, for completeness, in the appendix. The results (8)
and (9) therefore provide an efficient way to determine the EFCs (with respect to the
risk metric given by EEU) of marginal contributions to capacity in an environment
in which all capacity is provided by generation—a result which is also implicitly
obtained by [2]. The result (9) also plays an important part in an economic theory
of capacity markets—see Section 5.
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When the set of resources R may also include storage, the result (9) is no longer
valid and requires modification. It is necessary to understand how storage resources
may be optimally scheduled for the minimisation of EEU, and indeed how they
are rescheduled for this purpose as other capacity-providing resources are varied.
Assume, for simplicity, that storage may be completely recharged between periods of
what would, in the absence of such storage, be energy shortfall, but that storage may
not usefully be charged during such periods of shortfall. (This is currently the case in
many countries, such as GB, where periods of shortfall are generally well separated;
typically there is at most a single period of shortfall—the period of evening peak
demand—during any day, and storage may be fully recharged overnight.) Assume
also that any process of what would otherwise be continuous energy shortfall is to
be met as far as possible from available storage, with the aim of minimising any
residual unserved energy, and that each store i delivers energy subject to a rate
(power) constraint and a total energy constraint.3 At each time t define the residual
lifetime (or to-go time) of each store i as the residual energy in the store at time t
divided by the maximum rate at which that energy can be served. Then the above
minimisation of EEU is achieved by the use of the greedy algorithm in which, at
each successive time t during any period of shortfall, that shortfall is reduced as far
as possible from energy in storage and in which the use of the stores is prioritised
in descending order of their residual lifetimes. The optimality of the above policy
is proved in [4], and is also implicit in the results of [8]. Now let Se be the set of
stores which, under the above policy, are empty at the end of the day. (Note that,
since the shortfall process is typically random, so also is the set Se.) Then, in the
presence of storage the result (9) is replaced by the more general result
EEU′(R) = −LOLE(R \ Se), (10)
where R \ Se is the set of resources in R other than those in the set Se. This
result is formally proved in [4]. However, in essence the reason for it is that when,
under the above optimal scheduling algorithm, (marginal) firm capacity is added to
the set of resources R, any store which is not in Se (not empty at the end of the
shortfall period) continues to contribute over that period to the reduction of EEU
as if it were firm capacity with the same rate constraint, while those stores within
the set Se are rescheduled so that they continue to empty as before; the result (10)
is then a straightforward extension of (9).
We further remark that comparison of the results (9) and (10) yields the important
result that, when firm capacity is added to a set of resources R, it contributes
more effectively to the reduction of EEU when the set R already contains storage
resources which may then be rescheduled as above. A corollary is that the EFC
of further storage resources is typically reduced by the presence of existing storage
resources—see also Section 6 for an example of this.
3In other contexts the energy constraint might be referred to as the “capacity” of the store (as
measured, for example, in MWh). However, in the context of capacity markets, “capacity” has
units of power (as measured, for example, in MW), and we preserve this usage throughout this
paper.
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4 Capacity markets
In this section we consider the operation of a capacity market where the objective is
that of obtaining at minimum cost a sufficient set of capacity-providing resources R
so as to satisfy some condition
ρ(R) ≤ k, (11)
expressed in terms of some appropriate risk metric ρ. We assume throughout that
there is a fixed process of net demand to be met by these resources. The level k may
either be chosen so that the condition (11) defines some given security-of-supply
standard, or it may be chosen according to some economic criterion (see Section 5).
We allow that some resource may be provided by facilities other than firm capacity,
for example variable generation or storage. The required theory is the same as
that which is currently used in the presence of firm capacity (typically conventional
generation) only, except that it is necessary to appropriately define the EFCs of
other resources. Further some iterative and other additional calculation may be
required in the operation of any auction associated with the capacity market—at
least when resource other than firm capacity makes a substantial contribution.
An example is given by the capacity market which currently operates in GB [13],
and which typically seeks to secure a level of capacity compatible with the GB
LOLE-based security-of-supply standard (however, see also Section 5). The auction
associated with this market determines a unit clearing price such that any success-
ful bidder (capacity provider) in the auction receives this clearing price multiplied
by its offered capacity. When the latter is other than firm capacity, e.g. when it
is variable generation or storage, the bidder’s EFC is used instead and, since the
total such capacity is currently small, is reasonably estimated in advance of the
auction—essentially using the methodology described in Section 3. (This EFC is
usually represented by a de-rating factor which multiplies the nominal capacity of
the resource.) The GB auction is then conducted as a descending clock auction [13].
An initially high unit price is set, and this is then gradually reduced; bidders may
exit the auction at any point, and the auction stops at the point where there is just
sufficient capacity remaining in the auction to meet the required reliability stan-
dard (11) for the given LOLE-based risk metric ρ; the unit price at this point then
becomes the clearing price, and each successful bidder remaining in the auction is
then paid as above.
A descending clock auction as described above relies on the EFC of any capacity
other than firm capacity being clearly identified in advance of the auction. However,
as discussed in Section 3, the EFC of any such capacity-providing resource depends
also on the overall supply-demand balance process to which it is being added or
of which it forms a part—which, in the case of an auction, is that determined by
the overall set of resources R finally selected in the auction. It follows that, in the
presence of a substantial number of resources other than firm capacity, the form of
auction described above may require some adjustment—for example, as described
below.
In order to provide a better basis for a coherent theory, instead of considering the
minimum unit price (i.e. price per unit of EFC) which each bidder is prepared to
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accept for its capacity offering, we consider instead the minimum total price which
each bidder is prepared to accept in return for its contribution. Thus, in analysing
the operation of the capacity market we assume that each individual bidder or
resource i is willing to make available some given capacity for a given (minimum)
total price or cost ci. For example, this capacity might be a given level of firm
capacity for as long as might be required, or it might be storage which could be
called upon as required and which could be used flexibly subject to specified rate
and energy constraints. The societal problem is now to design an auction to choose
at minimum cost a subset R of those resources competing in the market, such that
the required reliability condition (11) is satisfied. We continue to assume that, in
the interests of fairness, associated with the outcome of any such auction is a unit
clearing price p such that, if R is the set of resources which are finally successful in
the auction, then
ci ≤ p× efcR(i), i ∈ R,
ci > p× efcR(i), i /∈ R,
(12)
and each successful resource i ∈ R is paid in total p × efcR(i). The relations (12)
define a competitive equilibrium condition necessarily satisfied by the unit clearing
price p and the required optimal set of resources R. That this is so depends implicitly
on the continuity and smoothness assumptions of Section 2. The continuity assump-
tion ensures that resource is reasonably continuously variable, and the smoothness
assumption guarantees the local additivity property of Section 3: under these as-
sumptions, were such a unit clearing price not to exist for the claimed optimal set of
resources R, then resource from outside that set might be more cheaply substituted
for resource from within it while continuing to satisfy the required reliability condi-
tion (11), contradicting the optimality of the set R. In general we might then expect
the relations (11) and (12) to define the required set of resources R uniquely, though
it is not clear that this is always guaranteed. (When, in the presence of one or more
large capacity-providing resources, the above continuity assumption breaks down,
there may be problems of “overshoot” in obtaining at minimum cost the required
capacity. When the number of such large resources is small, these problems may
usually be solved with a little experimentation; otherwise an integer optimisation
approach is required.)
When the EFCs efcR(i) are known—or may be reasonably be estimated—in advance,
the unit clearing price p may be identified by, for example, a descending clock auction
as described above: any bidder or resource i exits the auction if the descending unit
price falls below ci/efcR(i). Alternatively, if bidders were willing to declare their
minimum total prices ci in advance of the auction, the auction could be conducted
offline by ranking in ascending order the minimum unit prices ci/efcR(i) (to give
what is usually referred to in the context of energy markets as a merit order stack [17,
18]); the unit clearing price p would then be chosen so that the accepted set of
resources R, such that (12) held, was just sufficient to satisfy the required reliability
condition (11).
However, when there are substantial resources other than firm capacity participating
in the market, then the final EFCs efcR(i) of these resources (estimated with respect
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to the finally accepted resource set R) may not be sufficiently well known in advance
of any capacity auction. In order to identify a unit clearing price p and resource
set R such that the required conditions (11) and (12) hold, it may be necessary to
proceed iteratively: starting with initial estimates of the unknown EFCs, an initial
clearing price p and initial accepted resource set R may be obtained—e.g. through
the formation of a merit-order stack as above; on the basis of this set R, EFCs may
be re-estimated and improved values of the clearing price p and accepted resource
set R may then be obtained as before; since the set of capacity-providing resources
participating in the market is finite, one might reasonably expect convergence to a
solution of (11) and (12) within a fairly small number of iterations—see also the
examples of Section 6.
Finally, recall also that, while the theory of this section depends on the local ad-
ditivity of EFCs given by (7), such additivity does not hold over more extensive
variation of a set of resources. In particular, when resource other than firm capacity
is significant, it is not in general true that the sum
∑
i∈R efcR(i) of the EFCs of the
individual resources in the set R required to meet the given reliability condition (11)
is equal to the total firm capacity which would substitute for those resources in the
set R. Hence, in running a capacity auction under such circumstances it would be
necessary to periodically check, via a full probabilistic recalculation of the value of
the risk metric ρ for the set of resources so far obtained, whether one had yet selected
sufficient units from the merit-order stack as to satisfy the required condition (11).
Indeed, such checking may be necessary even in markets—such as that currently
operating in GB—in which most capacity is provided by conventional generation, as
the latter is also not quite firm capacity, and so here too there is the above problem
of nonadditivity of EFCs over significant numbers of resources. We give examples
of these issues in Section 6.
5 Economic approaches
The previous section considered the determination of the optimal set R of capacity-
providing resources needed to meet a given security-of-supply standard. However,
it is also possible to consider explicitly economic approaches to the determination of
electricity capacity. Thus one might choose the set of resources R so as to minimise
an overall economic cost. Such a cost has two components: the first is the economic
cost of the occasional failures of the set of resources R to provide such energy as
is needed, while the second is the cost, within a capacity market, of providing the
set of resources R itself. We consider the case where the first of these costs is given
by VOLL × EEU(R) where the constant VOLL is a unit value-of-lost-load and, as
usual, EEU(R) is the expected energy unserved associated with the optimal use of
the set of resources R. This measure is common in economic approaches to the
determination of electricity capacity adequacy—see [1, 2, 6]. In particular we follow
the approach which is sometimes used as a justification for the LOLE-based GB
capacity adequacy standard (again see [6]) and which is there derived under the
assumption that all generation participating in the capacity market is provided by
firm capacity—typically conventional generation. (The GB capacity market does
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not attempt to take account of possible variation in energy costs according to the
type of capacity selected; in practice this would be extremely difficult.) We examine
the extent to which the above approach generalises to include variable generation
and storage. Our particular interest is in the extent to which an economic criterion
based on the valuation of EEU may continue to be reduced to a risk-based criterion
expressible in terms of an LOLE-based security-of-supply standard. It turns out that
this may or may not be possible in the case where the capacity-providing resources
include variable generation, depending on the statistical characteristics of the latter,
but is not readily possible when these resources include storage.
We thus consider the economic problem of choosing a set of resources R so as to
minimise the overall economic cost
VOLL× EEU(R) + c(R), (13)
where VOLL is as above and where c(R) is the cost of providing the set of re-
sources R. We consider three cases of increasing generality.
All resource provided by firm capacity. We assume that all resource is provided
by firm capacity, and that the latter is reasonably continuously available. Thus the
set of resources R may be identified with the level of firm capacity it provides. The
overall cost (13) is a convex function of that capacity, and it follows that this function
is minimised at the level of capacity R such that
VOLL× EEU′(R) + c′(R) = 0, (14)
where, as usual, EEU′(R) is the derivative of EEU(R) with respect to firm capacity,
evaluated at R, and where c′(R) is the similarly the derivative with respect to firm
capacity of the cost c(R) of obtaining that capacity. In GB the derivative c′(R),
evaluated at the optimal level of capacity R as given by the solution of (14), is com-
monly referred to as the cost of new entry (CONE)—see [6]. It thus follows from (14)
and from the earlier result (9) that the optimal level of capacity minimising (13) is
given by the solution of
LOLE(R) =
CONE
VOLL
. (15)
The cost function c(R)—and in particular the quantity CONE = c′(R) evaluated
at the optimal level of capacity R—is of course determined by the capacity market.
However, c′(R) usually varies slowly with R and may often be estimated in advance
of any capacity auction (e.g. on the basis of earlier auctions—again see [6]). In this
case the relation (15) re-expresses the economic criterion of the present section (that
of minimising (13)) as a simple LOLE-based criterion, and the determination of the
minimum-cost level of capacity R such that (15) holds is as described in Section 4.
The above theory is sometimes used as an economic justification for the present
LOLE-based GB reliability standard. A description is given in [6], where the central
values of VOLL (17/kWh) and CONE (49/kW per year) identified in that report
correspond approximately, via (15), to the present GB reliability standard of a
(maximum) LOLE of 3 hours per year. Nevertheless, the values of CONE identified
in recent GB capacity auctions have varied very widely and are in all cases less
than the value quoted above (see [13]), so that the above economic justification
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for the present GB standard remains a somewhat theoretical one. An alternative
mechanism, now implemented within the most recent GB capacity auctions, is that
of including provision for obtaining a total level of capacity which depends on the
bidding taking place within the auction itself, so that the lower the level of bids
the greater the capacity obtained. This may be done through the specification of
a demand curve (see [14, 12, 22, 10]) which specifies the total level of capacity to
be obtained as a function of the clearing price in the auction. This approach is
straightforwardly implemented in, for example, the GB descending clock auction
as described in Section 4: as the unit price is decreased in successive rounds of
that auction, so the target capacity to be obtained is increased in line with the
specified demand curve; the auction clears when the offered capacity remaining in
the auction is equal to the current target capacity. While the GB demand curve
is currently determined by government policy, it could of course be chosen so that
the relation (15) was satisfied for the set of resources R obtained in the capacity
auction, with CONE as the dynamically determined clearing price of the auction.
The auction result would then satisfy the economic criterion (minimisation of (13))
of the present section.
All resource provided by generation of some form. Of interest now is the
extent to which above theory generalises to the more complex situation in which
all capacity is provided by either conventional or variable generation, but in which
storage is not present. There is then no scalar measure of capacity which is sufficient
to determine either EEU or LOLE. We do, however, have the following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that all capacity-providing resources are provided by some
form of generation, and suppose further that, as the set R of such resources is
varied, there is a one-one correspondence between values of EEU(R) and values of
LOLE(R). Then the optimal set of resources R minimising the overall economic
cost (13) is again that which minimises the cost c(R) of providing them subject to
the constraint (15).
A formal proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix. The essence of the argument
is that the existence of above one-one correspondence ensures that minimisation of
c(R) subject to a constraint on EEU(R) is equivalent to minimisation of c(R) subject
to the corresponding constraint on LOLE(R), thereby making it possible to “pivot”
a criterion based on the former to one based on the latter.
However, the above correspondence between values of EEU(R) and LOLE(R), while
clearly trivial in the case where all resource is provided by firm capacity only (since
both are decreasing functions of the level of that firm capacity), is not guaranteed in
the case where resource is also provided by variable generation. It is possible that,
in assessing its contribution to capacity adequacy, variable generation is capable
of being treated as if it were firm capacity at a constant and appropriately “de-
rated” level, so that the above one-one correspondence between EEU and LOLE is
maintained. Provided the level of variable generation is not great, this will be close
to being the case when, for example, the process of variable generation is statistically
independent of that of demand, in which case the de-rated level of variable generation
is close to its mean value—see [21]. However, it is also possible that the pattern of
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availability of variable generation—for example, throughout the day—is such that
this correspondence is not maintained. For example, it is possible that on occasions
periods of solar generation might be contained within periods of loss-of-load in such
a way that this generation contributes to the reduction of unserved energy without
reducing the duration of the loss-of-load periods. (This is particularly possible in
countries where energy shortfalls tend to occur in the middle of the day.) Under such
circumstances the determination of the optimal set of capacity-providing resources
minimising the overall economic cost (13) becomes more complicated.
Resource also provided by storage. This above theory does not directly gen-
eralise to the case where the capacity-providing resources include storage, for then,
for the reasons indicated in Section 3 and following from the flexibility of the way in
which storage may be used, the result (9)—upon which the above theory depends—
no longer holds. In this case the determination of the optimal set of capacity-
providing resources minimising (13) again becomes more complicated.
Finally, we remark that the economic cost of unserved energy given by VOLL ×
EEU(R) may be replaced by other measures if the latter are more appropriate.
Thus, for example, if unserved energy were valued more highly at higher levels of
shortfall, one might replace EEU by some form of appropriately weighted risk metric.
The above theory would then require only straightforward modifications.
6 Example
In this section we present a detailed example of energy storage and firm capacity
competing in a capacity market auction, and designed to illustrate most of the theory
of the present paper. In particular, we are concerned to show how to value correctly
the contribution of individual stores within a market to which storage makes a
significant contribution. The dimensions of the example correspond approximately
to those of the current GB electricity system, except that we allow more storage
than is currently present in that system. The objective within the example is that
of choosing at minimum cost a set of resources R to meet a given EEU reliability
standard. We take this to be 2746 MWh per year, as this corresponds to an LOLE
of approximately 3 hours per year (the GB standard) for generation and demand
broadly comparable to the current GB system.
We first create a credible background supply-demand balance process against which
the capacity auction is to take place—it is almost always the case that in any ca-
pacity auction there is pre-existing capacity already committed, e.g. from multi-year
auctions held in previous years, which therefore does not compete in the current auc-
tion. For this background process we assume a set of 230 conventional generators
with a total of 61.36 GW of installed capacity. Capacities and outage probabilities
for these conventional generators are taken from a 2015–16 National Grid scenario
for GB, with random noise added to protect the sensitivity of the data. The avail-
ability of each generator is modelled as a two-state Markov process in which each
generator is either completely available or completely unavailable, with a mean time
to failure of 50 hours and a mean time to repair such that the equilibrium out-
age probability of the generator agrees with National Grid’s scenario values (see [7]
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for more details). An empirical demand-net-of-wind process is created from paired
hourly observations of GB electricity demand and wind generation for the winter
season 2010–11 rescaled to 2015–16 levels of demand and an assumed installed to-
tal wind generation capacity of 14 GW (see [20] for more details of this). From
this demand-net-of-wind process are subtracted 100 simulations of the conventional
generation process to create 100 simulations of a residual demand process, which de-
fines a sufficiently representative background process for the present example. The
further firm capacity which would require to be subtracted from this background
demand process in order to meet the target reliability standard of 2746 MWh per
year is 1973 MW. This residual demand or background process is to be managed
instead from the further generation and storage resources obtained in the capacity
market. The volume of resource to be obtained in this market corresponds to that
which might be required in a “top-up” capacity market, such as that held in GB
one year ahead of real time.
Competition in the capacity market is provided by 120 stores and 30 units of firm
capacity. The rate and energy constraints of the stores are chosen to be represen-
tative of those typically found in systems such as that of GB. However, in order
to illustrate some of the concerns of the present paper, which are most relevant to
future systems in which storage may play a larger part, we choose a relatively large
number of such stores. We assume there are 60 stores with a rate constraint of 50
MW; 10 of these stores have an energy constraint of 12.5 MWh, 15 have an energy
constraint of 25 MWh, 15 have an energy constraint of 50 MWh, and 20 have an
energy constraint of 100 MWh. We further assume there are 60 stores with a rate
constraint of 100 MW; 10 of these stores have an energy constraint of 25 MWh, 15
have an energy constraint of 50 MWh, 15 have an energy constraint of 100 MWh
and 20 have an energy constraint of 200 MWh. The firm capacity units are assumed
to have capacities between 10 MW and 100 MW. There are three units for each
multiple of 10 MW capacity (i.e. three units with capacity of 10 MW, three with
capacity of 20 MW, etc). The minimum total price ci at which each store or unit
of firm capacity i is prepared to make itself available (see Section 3) is set to be
approximately proportional to the EFC of that resource with some statistical vari-
ation. (For a store this EFC is taken to be as estimated against an approximation
of the set of resources R finally selected in the capacity market auction, while for
a firm capacity resource its EFC is of course just that capacity.) This means that
the stores and firm capacity units are generally competitive with each other in any
capacity auction. The constant of proportionality is comparable with that which
has held in recent GB capacity auctions. (The latter is very considerably lower than
the reference value of 49/kW per year discussed in Section 5.)
The EFC efcR(i) of any storage unit i, relative to (the supply-demand balance pro-
cess defined by) any set of resources R to which it is being added, is calculated as
described in Section 3. In all cases storage is optimally scheduled for the minimi-
sation of EEU as described in that section and on the assumption that all storage
may be completely recharged overnight, but not at other times. Recall that, from
the algorithm described in Section 3, the optimal scheduling of storage at any time t
depends only on the shortfall process at time t and the charge states of the stores
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at time t. This scheduling may therefore be done separately for each simulation
of the shortfall or background process to which the storage is being added. The
EEU resulting from any configuration of resources in the capacity auction is thus
estimated by the average remaining energy unserved calculated separately using the
above algorithm for each of the 100 simulations of the initial background process.
The determination of the optimal set of resources R meeting the required EEU reli-
ability standard at minimum cost is as described in Section 4. Thus it is necessary
to determine a set of resources R—from amongst those participating in the capacity
market—and a clearing price p such that the reliability condition (11) and the equi-
librium conditions (12) are satisfied. (Recall, from Section 4, that the conditions (11)
and (12) are necessarily satisfied at the optimal set R and may reasonably be ex-
pected to determine that set uniquely.) Again as discussed in Section 4, the solution
of these equations would be straightforward in the case where the EFCs efcR(i)
of the participating resources were known in advance: it would simply be a case
of organising these resources in a merit-order stack and then choosing a minimum
clearing price p such that, under (12), sufficient resources were selected so that (11)
was also satisfied—the corresponding total price p
∑
i∈R efcR(i) would then be the
minimum possible. However, for resources other than those capable of being mod-
elled as firm capacity (at least to a good approximation, as is the case for suitably
derated conventional generation), their EFCs efcR(i) depend on the finally accepted
set R, and so are not known prior to the attempted solution of the conditions (11)
and (12). Under those circumstances in which the nature of the final resource mix
is reasonably predictable—as where there is relatively little resource which is not
capable of being modelled as firm capacity, or where there is significant experience
from previous auctions—it may be possible to make reasonable advance estimates
of such EFCs. However, in the present example there is a relatively large volume of
storage participating in the market, and the EFCs of the stores are not well known
in advance of the solution of the conditions (11) and (12). We therefore solve these
equations iteratively: we make initial estimates of the storage EFCs—as described
below for the present GB capacity market—and use these estimated EFCs to obtain
an initial clearing price p and set of resources R such that (11) and (12) are satisfied
with these initial estimates substituting for the true EFCs (again this is done by
forming an merit-order stack using these estimated EFCs); the set of resources R
obtained is then used to form revised EFC estimates efcR(i) for all storage resources
participating in the capacity market, and the process repeated until after several
iterations R converges to a fixed set satisfying the conditions (11) and (12) with the
EFCs now correctly calculated with respect to that set R. The solution obtained—
the set of resources meeting the required reliability standard at minimum cost on a
pay-as-clear basis—is a combination of 550 MW of firm capacity and a set of stores
the sum of whose EFCs efcR(i) evaluated with respect to R is 1134 MW. These are
the EFCs appropriate to the marginal contributions of the individual stores (as is
appropriate to the optimal operation of the capacity market—see Section 4), and
determine their payments received in the capacity market—the payment received by
each individual store i being of course at least as great as the minimum price ci which
that store is prepared to accept. However, the EFC of the entire set of accepted
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stores—treated as a single unit—is 1423 MW, i.e. this is the amount of further firm
capacity which would be required to substitute for the entire set of accepted stores
in order to meet the required EEU reliability standard. This is a fairly extreme
case, in the current example in which a large volume of storage is present, of the
nonadditivity of EFCs over significant numbers of resources, as discussed at the end
of Section 4. It is further a reflection of the observation, at the end of Section 3,
that the EFC of further storage resources is typically reduced by the presence of
existing storage resources. A similar phenomenon is well known in the case of cer-
tain variable generation such as wind power, although the reason for the latter is
very different and results there from the temporal coincidence of wind resources at
different locations.
In GB the capacity market is settled through a single-pass descending-clock auction
which identifies the required clearing price. (Similar auctions are conducted in other
countries.) Thus in GB the EFCs of storage facilities—which now participate in
the GB capacity market—are estimated in advance of the capacity auction. The
EFC efcR(i) of each store i is determined as described in the present paper, but
is done so with respect to an “initial” set of resources R which is taken to be the
amount of firm capacity which would be required in order to meet the GB reliability
standard. In GB most resource currently participating in the market is indeed firm
capacity, or at least conventional generation, and the storage EFCs estimated as
above are close to their true values, i.e. to those calculated with respect to the
set of resources R finally obtained in the market. However, the example of the
present section is chosen so that storage plays a significant role—something which
may very well also be the case in future real energy systems. If, in this example,
the EFC efcR(i) of each store i is determined as is current practice in GB (i.e. as its
contribution when added to an existing set of resources R consisting of firm capacity
and just sufficient to meet the required reliability standard) then the storage EFCs
so obtained prove to be considerable overestimates in comparison with their true
values—those calculated with respect to the optimal set of resources determined as
described above and meeting the reliability standard at minimum cost. The reason
for this is again as discussed at the end of Section 3: storage added to existing
storage is less valuable than when added to firm capacity providing the same level
of reliability. A consequence, in the present example, of this overvaluation of the
contribution of storage would be that—if uncorrected—all the resource obtained in
the capacity market would consist of storage. Further, with the realistic resource
costs chosen for this example, the cost of obtaining sufficient (all storage) resources
to correctly meet the required reliability standard would be £58.1m, whereas the
true cost of the optimal resource set (as identified earlier and consisting of a mixture
of firm capacity and storage) to meet that reliability standard is £49.7m. The more
careful evaluation of the contribution of storage in the present example therefore
leads to a cost saving of 14.5% in the capacity market of this example.
Finally we test more carefully the extent to which the continuity and smoothness
assumptions of Section 2 are applicable in the current example. Figure 2 shows the
effect of starting with the background system of pre-existing capacity and gradually
adding to it all the capacity-providing resources competing in the auction, taken
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in the order of the final merit-order stack. The figure plots residual EEU against
cumulative EFC. At each point the latter is again the firm capacity which would
substitute for the resources added so far while maintaining the same level of residual
EEU (so that the underlying relationship defined by the plotted points is in fact
independent of the order in which the resources are taken). We see that, as required
for the continuity assumption, there are no large gaps between successive points. In
particular these points are dense in the region corresponding to the target EEU for
the auction—as represented by the horizontal line. We therefore conclude that the
continuity assumption is sufficiently well satisfied.
Figure 3 examines the validity of the smoothness assumption (3). The set R is
taken to be the set of resources identified by the capacity auction (as is appropriate
in the application of the smoothness assumption.) Figure 3 shows, as a “heat plot”,
the percentage variation between the left and right sides of (3) where i and j both
correspond to stores of 100 MWh energy and levels of power which in each case vary
from 10 to 50 MW. The lowest powered stores contribute only modest additional
capacity, and here the smoothness assumption (3) is seen to be very accurate. The
highest powered stores contribute substantial additional capacity; nevertheless here
the difference between the left and right sides of (3) is no more than 5%. Similar
results would be obtained if the additional resources i and j corresponded to firm
capacity or conventional generation, as in established current capacity markets. The
smoothness assumption therefore also appears sufficiently well satisfied here.
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Figure 2: Plot of residual EEU again cumulative EFC (see text). The horizontal
line corresponds to the target EEU standard.
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Figure 3: Heat plot to examine the accuracy of the smoothness assumption (3).
The set R is as defined by the outcome of the capacity auction, the x- and y-axes
give respectively the powers of the additional stores i and j, and the plot shows the
percentage variation between the left and right sides of (3).
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Appendix: technical results
In this appendix we formalise and prove two technical results in the present paper.
Proof of equation (9). We prove the result given by equation (9), namely that
for any set of capacity-providing resources R which consists entirely of generation,
either conventional or variable, we have that the derivative EEU′(R) of EEU(R)
with respect to variation of firm capacity is given by −LOLE(R).
For each time t let the random variable Zt be the supply-demand balance at time t
corresponding to the use of the set of resources R. Then, from (2), for any addition
to R of firm capacity equal to δ,
EEU(R+ δ) =
n∑
t=1
∫ 0
−∞
P(Zt + δ < z) dz =
n∑
t=1
∫ −δ
−∞
P(Zt < z) dz,
so that, differentiating with respect to δ and then setting δ = 0, we have
EEU′(R) = −
n∑
t=1
P(Zt < 0) = −LOLE(R)
from (1) as required.
Proof of Proposition 1. For any possible risk level k of EEU, define Rk to
be the set of resources R which minimises the cost c(R) subject to the constraint
EEU(R) = k. Given the risk level k, the subproblem of determining Rk is the
problem considered in Section 4. The additional problem in the minimisation of the
overall economic cost (13) may therefore be viewed as that of determining the value
of k such that Rk minimises
VOLL× EEU(Rk) + c(Rk), (16)
(with EEU(Rk) = k) i.e. that of determining the optimal level of EEU to be then
obtained at minimum cost. We may consider the effect of infinitesimal variation of
the risk level k by considering the corresponding required infinitesimal variation in
EFC, where the latter is defined with respect to Rk. At that value of k such that the
overall economic cost (16) is minimised, we have stationarity with respect to such
variation, so that at this value of k, analogously to (14),
VOLL× EEU′(Rk) + c′(Rk) = 0, (17)
where it follows from the definition of EFC in Section 3 that EEU′(Rk) may continue
to be interpreted as defined in that section, i.e. as the derivative of EEU(Rk) with
respect to firm capacity, and where c′(Rk) may similarly continue to be interpreted
as the cost of new entry (CONE) at the level of resource defined by Rk. Since it
is assumed that all capacity-providing resource consists of some form of generation,
the result (9) holds and so, analogously to (15), it follows that at the value of k such
that the overall cost (13) is minimised,
LOLE(Rk) =
CONE
VOLL
. (18)
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Now recall that, for each k, the set Rk is defined as minimising c(R) subject to the
constraint EEU(R) = k. It follows from the assumed one-one correspondence be-
tween values of EEU(R) and those of LOLE(R) that Rk is also the set of resources R
which minimises c(R) subject to the corresponding constraint on LOLE(R). It thus
follows from (18) that, exactly as in the case where all resource is provided by firm
capacity only, the determination of the optimal set of capacity-providing resources
minimising the overall economic cost (13) is again given by the minimisation of the
cost c(R) subject to the constraint (15).
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